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REHEARING SUA SPONTE IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A
PROCEDURE FOR JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING
ROSEMARY KRIMBEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has the discretion to select the cases that it will
hear each term by granting writs of certiorari.I This writ orders the vari-
ous courts of appeals to certify the record in a case and send that case to
the Supreme Court for review. In addition, after granting a writ of certi-
orari and hearing oral argument, the Court may upon its own motion (or
sua sponte)2 request the litigants to reargue3 a case, commonly called re-
hearing.4 There are good reasons why the Court should and does request
rehearing. This Note, however, addresses the one wrong reason-
policymaking.5
* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor J. Gordon Hylton, Jr., IIT Chicago-
Kent College of Law, for his support, encouragement, and helpful consultations during the various
stages of this article.
1. Supreme Court Case Selections Act, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988); see infra
notes 54-58 and accompanying text; see also G. CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1976) (elucidating the process of granting certiorari); Sup. CT. R. 17.1 ("A re-
view on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefor.").
2. A Latin phrase meaning voluntarily without prompting or suggestion. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1277 (5th ed. 1979).
3. The use of the word "reargument" is often used interchangeably with the word "rehear-
ing." "Reargument," however, generally refers to oral argument before the Court; "rehearing" en-
compasses not only "reargument," but also requests for written briefs and written submissions to
questions from the bench.
4. The Supreme Court Rules guide the granting of petitions for rehearing. See infra notes 81-
85 and accompanying text; see also Sup. CT. R. 51.1; Degnan & Louisell, Rehearing in American
Appellate Courts, 34 CAN. B. REv. 898, 901-02 (1956).
5. The Court can decide only "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
As Justice Roberts, writing for a majority, so eloquently said:
There should be no misunderstanding as to the function of this court .... It is
sometimes said that the Court assumes a power to overrule or control the action of the
people's representatives. This is a misconception. The Constitution is the supreme law of
the land ordained and established by the people. All legislation must conform to the prin-
ciples it lays down. When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as
not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has
only one duty, - to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the court
does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the question. The only power
it has, if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. This court neither approves nor
condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare
whether the legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention of, the provisions of the
Constitution; and, having done that, its duty ends.
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Through the interplay of the Court's discretion to grant writs of
certiorari and request rehearing sua sponte, the Court may reach out and
pick specific issues6 as well as cases. This interplay raises the specter of
what has been called the "countermajoritarian difficulty," which arises
when the politically unaccountable Court intervenes in the political pro-
cess.7 The memorandum opinion that requested reargument in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union s brought to the forefront the question of
whether the Court's inherent power to administer its docket 9-the foun-
dation for its ability to rehear cases sua sponte-may be abused by an
activist Court. 10
With the enactment of the Supreme Court Case Selections Act 1 in
1988, the United States Supreme Court now has more discretion than
ever to choose the cases that it reviews with the exception of direct ap-
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936); see Hanus, Denial of Certiorari and Supreme Court
Policy-Making, 17 AM. U.L. REv. 41, 41-56 (1967) (analyzing criminal procedure cases and arguing
that case selection is sometimes used to avoid difficult issues or to make policy indirectly); see gener-
ally D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT (1985).
6. Appellate courts often reformulate fuzzy issues that litigants fail to sharpen, and while issue
clarification is sometimes necessary, wholesale restatement of the issues is relatively rare. By consti-
tutional design, cases arrive in the Supreme Court after the issues have percolated through the polit-
ical process and have been framed by the litigants. Once a case or controversy has reached the
Supreme Court, the Court has the power to reframe or clarify the issues within the context of the
case. Consequently, no matter how broad a brush the Court uses upon the canvass of the case, the
Court still must wait for the litigants to present them with a canvass before the Court can begin to
paint. It is "going off the canvass" that causes many lawyers to believe that appellate decisions are
mere acts of will, and this in turn causes a lack of confidence in the decisionmaking power of appel-
late courts. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON-LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 3-7, 29-33
(1960).
7. When the Supreme Court declares legislation unconstitutional, the Court imposes constitu-
tional restraints upon the political process. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITIcS 16-23 (1986); see also Address by Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., delivered to the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct. 12,
1985) (available in Chicago-Kent Law Review Office) ("Our commitment to self-governance in a
representative democracy must be reconciled with vesting in electorally unaccountable Justices the
power to invalidate the expressed desires of representative bodies on the ground of inconsistency
with higher law.").
8. 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
9. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT v-viii (1928)
(noting that the administration of the Court's docket is as important to efficient adjudication as the
process of judicial decisionmaking itself).
10. The Supreme Court's memorandum decision in Patterson was front page news across the
country. See, e.g., Greenberg, Distressing Signals From the Court, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1988, at
A31, col. 2 (Court's action suggests an agenda of civil rights retrenchment); TRB, The Fifth Man,
NEW REPUBLIC, May 16, 1988, at 4 (referring to Justice Kennedy as the "fifth" vote in the Patterson
memorandum decision); Jacoby & McDaniel, Why Open a Closed Case? Upheaval on the Court,
NEWSWEEK, May 9, 1988, at 69 (Court's action came as a shock); Lacayo, Play It Again, Says the
Court, TIME, May 9, 1988, at 73 (Reconsideration of major civil rights ruling signals the start of a
conservative judicial majority); Suddenly, the Conservatives Start Stirring, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., May 9, 1988, at 11 (Kennedy swinging court to the right).
11. Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988).
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peals from three-judge panels.1 2 Although this case selection discretion
gives the Court the opportunity to seek out specific issues, the Court still
must wait for an issue to be presented to it within the context of a case or
controversy. As a result, the Court can address the policy decisions
made by the politically accountable branches-Congress and the Execu-
tive-only when presented with legal challenges to those decisions. But
the Court has the inherent ability to add an issue to a case already on its
docket simply by requesting rehearing sua sponte, as the Court did in the
Patterson case over vigorous dissents by four Justices.13 This Note will
examine how the Supreme Court's broad discretion to select cases and
issues14 has changed the Court from a passive institution "with neither
force nor will but merely judgment"15 to the influential arbiter of
"whether the political solutions to major national problems devised by
the legislative and executive branches [will] be allowed to proceed."
1 6
After a brief history of the major congressional statutes enacted
under Article III's exceptions and regulations clause' 7 and a review of
the historic justifications for the Court's inherent sua sponte powers,18
this Note will scrutinize the necessity for the Court's power to request
rehearing sua sponte.19 It will then look at two cases in which the Court
caused concern when it requested rehearing sua sponte.20 Last, it will
critically examine the need to request rehearing sua sponte and the appro-
priateness of the Court's use of this power. 21 This Note concludes with
the recommendation that Congress amend Supreme Court Rule 51, the
rehearing rule, and specify only two instances when the Court may re-
quest rehearing sua sponte: (1) when the Court is equally divided; or (2)
when it is reconstituted.
12. The Court still must hear direct appeals from three-judge panels, which mostly concern
legislative apportionment cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988); Boskey & Gressman, The Supreme
Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 109 S. Ct. 412, 428-30 (1988).
13. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988) (per curiam); 485 U.S. at 619
(Blackmun, J., with whom Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., join, dissenting); 485 U.S. at
621 (Stevens, J., with whom Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., join, dissenting). See also
infra notes 132-62 and accompanying text.
14. This Note will not address the opposite dimension of the problem with docket control
where the Court chooses inaction and defers to the political process when judicial action is indicated.
See, e.g., Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (New American Library ed. 1961).
16. W. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 305 (1987).
17. See text accompanying notes 36-55.
18. See text accompanying notes 56-78.
19. See text accompanying notes 79-97.
20. See text accompanying notes 98-161.
21. See text accompanying notes 162-189.
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II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S APPELLATE
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is both original and appellate,
as defined in Article III of the Constitution. 22 The Court's original juris-
diction extends to all cases "affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters, and Consuls," and cases "in which a State shall be a party. ' 23 The
Court's appellate jurisdiction extends the federal judicial power to all
other cases.24 It is the more important jurisdiction because it enables the
Court to disregard the barrier of federalism 25 and reach not only federal,
but also state, cases and controversies.26 It is the appellate jurisdiction
that the Constitution subjects to congressional regulation. Article III ex-
plicitly states that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is con-
ferred "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress
shall make."' 27 Although the literal language of the Exceptions Clause
22. U.S. CONST. art. III. Article III created the judicial branch of the United States tripartite
structure of government and vested all of the judicial power, both original and appellate, in one
"supreme Court" and "in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." Id.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988) governs the Court's original jurisdiction and provides that the
Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of controversies between two or more states. See also
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972) (political subdivisions within states, such as cities, are
not states for purposes of § 1251). Although § 1251 speaks of the Court's original jurisdiction, the
Court itself has said that "It]he original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred not by Con-
gress but by the Constitution itself. This jurisdiction is self-executing and needs no legislative imple-
mentation." California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979) (Court avoided the question of
congressional power to limit Court's original jurisdiction).
24. Article III extends this power to
all Cases, in Law and Equity arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . -to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party; ... [between a State and Citizens of another State;] -between Citizens of
different States -between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of dif-
ferent States, [and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.]
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (Bracketed material refers to changes made by the Eleventh Amend-
ment to the Constitution).
25. "Federalism" describes the interrelationships among the several states and the relationship
between the states and the federal government. H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING:
EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION 11-13 (1979).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988) governs the routing of cases from the state courts to the Supreme
Court. Prior to the Supreme Court Case Selections Act, a state case had a mandatory right of appeal
to the Supreme Court if a state court found a federal law invalid or if a state court found valid a state
law that was contested under a federal provision. In both of these cases, state law was pitted against
federal law, and state verdicts in favor of the state law were presumed suspect. Congress, however,
rejected this premise as unduly suspicious of the state courts, and rewrote § 1257 so that the
Supreme Court has the discretion whether to review state court decisions no matter which way the
state ruled in the case. See H.R. REP. No. 660, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 772.
27. The Constitution mandates the existence and contours of the Court's original jurisdiction,
with which Congress may not tamper. The Constitution, however, vests in Congress the power to
make "exceptions and regulations" regarding the Court's appellate jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art.
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gives plenary power to Congress to regulate the Supreme Court's juris-
diction, other clauses of the Constitution may implicitly limit Congress'
ability to do so. 28 Moreover, Congress may not be able to regulate the
Court's appellate jurisdiction in a manner that is inconsistent with the
Court's essential role in the constitutional plan.29
Despite these broad constitutional and systemic limits, Congress
has never granted to the Supreme Court all the power provided by Arti-
cle 11J.30 The Court has acknowledged that it understands the affirma-
tive descriptions of its appellate jurisdiction to negate all other
III, § 2. While the Supreme Court has never definitively answered the question of how complete the
scope of congressional authority is under the Exceptions Clause, it is generally considered to be
broad. See Anderson, The Power of Congress to Limit the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 1981 DET. C.L. REv. 753; see also C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATEs 24-25 (1928); see generally D. CURRIE, supra note 5.
The Supreme Court did address the scope of congressional control of the Court's appellate
jurisdiction in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), which arose when Congress re-
moved the Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases. McCardle had appealed a denial of
a writ of habeas corpus in a case that arose under the Reconstruction statutes, and Congress, fearing
that the Court would invalidate much of the Reconstruction legislation, did not want the Court to
hear the case. The Court held that Congress had the power to make such an exception. In dicta,
however, the Court said that it still had the power to issue original writs of habeas corpus, and
therefore, Congress' action did not totally remove the Court's jurisdiction to reach the Reconstruc-
tion statutes. Id. at 515 (referring to Ex parte McCardle, 73 (6 Wall.) 318, 324 (1867)). Although
this case is often cited for the proposition that Congress has full control of the Court's appellate
jurisdiction, more recent literature suggests that Congress cannot destroy as in McCardle the essen-
tial role of the Court by limiting access to constitutional cases that involve the supremacy of federal
law. See Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress'A uthority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 42-68 (1981); see also Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's
Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53 (1962) (proposing that exceptions
clause applies to questions of fact and not to questions of law).
28. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (under the Due Process Clause, Congress could not ex-
clude specific classes of litigants from access to the Supreme Court); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (under
the prohibition of Bills of Attainder, for instance, it would be unconstitutional for Congress to ex-
clude jurisdiction as pertains to a specific litigant). Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal
Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 916-21
(1984); see Gressman & Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of Exceptions to Federal Jurisdiction,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495 (1983).
29. This "Essential Functions" doctrine, proposed by Leonard Ratner in two major articles,
states that Congress may not interfere with the Court's function of providing a uniform interpreta-
tion of federal law and policing state courts' enforcement of federal law. See Ratner, Majoritiarian
Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L.
REV. 929 (1982); Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); see also Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress's Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
Another implicit constraint on Congress' power to restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction is
the doctrine of separation of powers. It is often argued that the implicit doctrine of Separation of
Powers also limits Congress' ability to regulate the Court's jurisdiction. For instance, Congress
could not use its Exception Clause power to demand that the Court act in an unconstitutional way.
See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-48 (1871) (holding unconstitutional a con-
gressional attempt to prescribe a rule of decision regarding effect of a pardon).
30. See Chapter 81 of Title 28 Judiciary and Judicial Procedures which limits access to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1258 (1988).
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jurisdiction that Congress does not affirmatively grant.31
A. Congressional Regulation of the Supreme Court's
Appellate Jurisdiction
Congress first regulated the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
in the Judiciary Act of 1789.32 The Act gave appellate jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court by writ of error, which mandated that the Court review
cases for supposed errors of law, and Congress limited review of state
court decisions to those cases in which the decision was against a federal
claimant. 33 Because the Act was contemporary to the Constitution it-
self,3 4 many scholars view it as an authoritative source of the original
understanding of the Supreme Court's role in our government. Further-
more, the Act was a successful compromise between the Federalists, who
wanted a broad, sweeping judiciary, and the Anti-Federalists, who
31. In Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), the Court said:
[Tihe judicial act was an exercise of the power given by the Constitution to Congress "of
making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." "They have de-
scribed affirmatively," said the court, "its jurisdiction, and this affirmative description has
been understood to imply a negation of the exercise of such appellate power as is not
comprehended within it."
The principle that the affirmation of appellate jurisdiction implies the negation of all
such jurisdiction not affirmed having been thus established, it was an almost necessary
consequence that acts of Congress, providing for the exercise of jurisdiction, should come
to be spoken of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not as acts making exceptions to the
constitutional grant of it.
Id. at 513 (quoting Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810) (Marshall,
C.J.)).
32. The first order of business in the First Session of the First Congress was Senate Bill No. I,
which became the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Act infused Article III with substance and detailed
those ingredients necessary for the "due process of law" that the Bill of Rights guaranteed. Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). For an excellent history of the debates which led to the Judiciary
Act, see Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv.
49 (1923).
33. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 reads:
And be it further enacted, that a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of
law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in
question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United
States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity
of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being
repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in
favour of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause
of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United
States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or
claimed by either party, under such clause of the said constitution, treaty, statute or com-
mission, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United
States upon a writ of error ....
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (1789).
34. The Constitution. was signed September 17, 1787. Nine states were needed for ratification,
and the necessary ninth state, New Hampshire, approved the Constitution in June 1788. In 1790,
Rhode Island became the last of the original thirteen states to ratify the new Constitution. The Bill
of Rights, the first ten amendments, was added to the Constitution in 1791. Congress enacted the
Judiciary Act in 1789, soon after ratification gave it the power to so do.
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wanted a federal judiciary of limited, minimal power. 35 The Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction remained confined under this Act for eighty-six years.
Nearly one hundred years later, Congress expanded the Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction in the Act of March 3, 1875, which for the first time
conferred on the federal courts general federal question jurisdiction.
36
This grant of jurisdiction allowed the Supreme Court to review all cases
"arising under" the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
37
Prior to the Act, the majority of cases came before the Court on the basis
of diversity of citizenship, 38 which offered a federal forum to litigants
who feared local prejudice if their cases were heard before a state court.
39
As the country grew, so did the Supreme Court's docket, and the
Court found it increasingly difficult to keep up with its workload. To
alleviate the crush of cases, Congress introduced a discretionary element
into the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act of 1891, which instituted the use of the writ of certiorari
and created the circuit courts of appeals. 40 The writ of certiorari allowed
the Court, for the first time, the discretion to choose which cases it would
hear and, consequently, which cases it would not hear. Prior to this Act,
every litigant in a federal forum had a right to appeal her case all the way
to the Supreme Court, and many did so. Although after the Act of 1891
a litigant retained the ability to appeal as a matter of right, that appeal
was now to the circuit court, and not normally to the Supreme Court.
The circuit courts of appeals eased the Supreme Court's docket, and the
35. Warren, supra note 32, at 53-54.
36. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. This Act, among other things, extended the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to all cases which arose under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States. G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 17. The Act added tremen-
dously to the business of the Supreme Court when the Court vastly expanded the definition of "aris-
ing under" in its construction of the Act in Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885). The
Court's construction of the Act allowed any suit against the federally chartered Pacific Railroad to
"arise under" the laws of the United States. Id. at 11. Negligence suits against the Pacific Railroad
deluged the Court and put pressure on the Court's docket. This pressure led to the Judiciary Act of
1891. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 9, at 69-78.
37. A unanimous Supreme Court recently defined "arising under" as "only those cases in
which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that
the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
38. See G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 17.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988) parrots the language of the Constitution and grants federal juris-
diction in "controversies ... between - (1) citizens of different states; (2) citizens of a State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state."
40. Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891); see also Durham v. United
States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (appeals are a matter of right, while Supreme Court's certiorari
decisions are wholly discretionary); F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 9, at 69; 2 C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 727-28 (1947). See generally Hanus,
Certiorari and Policy-Making in English History, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 63 (1968) (discussing the
writ of certiorari as an English docket control device).
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number of appeals to the circuit courts grew. 41 Appeals as a matter of
right still remained for many classes of cases. Because many litigants
continued to exercise this right of appeal to the Supreme Court, the
Court again fell behind in its workload.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the steady expansion of
litigation on social and economic legislation42 caused burgeoning de-
mands on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. It was clear that a
new judiciary act was necessary and, at the time, the Court was led by
Chief Justice William Howard Taft, who was not only an adept leader,
but an astute politician as well. 43 Taft led the movement for the Court's
institutional independence, and he was responsible for the passage of the
Judiciary Act of 1925,4 which gave the Supreme Court effective control
over its own docket.45 Chief Justice Taft, an expert administrator,4
pushed for judicial reform and drafted the Act of 1925. 47 The 1925 Act
reduced the number of appeals as a matter of right and replaced auto-
matic access to the Supreme Court with discretionary review by writ of
certiorari, allowing the Supreme Court to refuse to hear many of the
requests for appellate review. This Act, with little modification over the
years, governed access to the Supreme Court until the Supreme Court
41. Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE
L.J. 1, 2 (1925) ("Speaking generally, [the circuit courts] were always abreast of their docket, and
their activity soon removed the 'hump' in the docket of the Supreme Court.").
42. Some commentators believe that the crushing demand upon the Court's docket was a result
of the Court's "propensity to declare social and economic legislation unconstitutional." G. CASPER
& R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 18; see R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 41
(5th ed. 1978); Rice, How the Supreme Court Mill is Working, 56 AM. U.L. REv. 763 (1922) (includ-
ing docket statistics from 1916 to 1921).
43. William H. Taft has been the only person to serve both as President of the United States
and as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
44. Act of February 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
45. The Judiciary Act of 1925 permitted the Court to dispose of less important and less worthy
cases by simply denying certiorari. See Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme
Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 575 (1972); G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 20, Table 2.6; see also
F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 9, at 258 ("In marking the boundaries of the Court's
jurisdiction its broad categories must be supplemented by ample discretion, permitting review by the
Supreme Court in the individual case which reveals a claim fit for decision by the tribunal of last
resort.").
46. According to Taft's biographer, Chief Justice Taft said of the Court's appellate jurisdiction:
It was vital, he said in opening his drive for the Judges' bill, that cases before the Court be
reduced without limiting the function of pronouncing "the last word on every important
issue under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States." A supreme court, on
the other hand, should not be a tribunal obligated to weigh justice among contesting par-
ties.
"They have had all they have a right to claim," Taft said, "when they have had two
courts in which to have adjudicated their controversy."
2 H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFrT 997-98 (1939) (footnote
omitted).
47. In his book, Chief Justice Rehnquist refers to the Judiciary Act of 1925 as the Certiorari
Act of 1925. W. REHNQUIST, supra note 16, at 268.
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Case Selection Act of 1988.48
On June 27, 1988, Congress passed the Supreme Court Case Selec-
tions Act,49 which eliminated, with the exception of direct appeals from
three-judge panels, 50 all of the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate ju-
risdiction. The Act governs the routing of cases from the lower federal
courts to the Supreme Court, 51 allowing the Supreme Court total discre-
tion to choose which cases come before it. Accordingly, the only way for
a litigant to have his case heard in the Supreme Court is for the Supreme
Court itself to grant the litigant's request for certiorari. The case-selec-
tion process, therefore, is immensely important on a practical level be-
cause the first issue which the Court now addresses is whether it should
decide a case on the merits and involve itself in a confrontation with
Congress or the Executive Branch. Moreover, case selection permits the
Court to determine its level of involvement in state and local governmen-
tal issues by deciding whether to hear appeals from the various state
courts. This case-selection discretion enhances the Court's inherent
power as a judiciary.
B. The Supreme Court's Inherent Power
The Supreme Court's power to administer justice is not simply the
power to apply the law to the facts of a case, but also the power to
achieve equitable results under the law due to the Constitution's merger
of law and equity 52 in the federal judicial power. 53 Under English law,
upon which the Framers drew in establishing the federal judicial power,
48. Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988).
49. Id.
50. Direct appeal from a three-judge court is still available under the 1988 Act. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1253 (1988). In 1976, however, Congress severely limited this form of tribunal to legislative appor-
tionment cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1988).
51. The Supreme Court Case Selections Act allows a litigant to petition the Supreme Court for
certiorari once the district court has entered a final judgment. Therefore, a litigant may file an
appeal in the court of appeals and petition the Supreme Court for certiorari on the same day. The
Act allows the Supreme Court to grant or deny certiorari "before or after" the court of appeals
renders judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1988). For legislative history and purpose of the Act, see
H.R. REP. No. 660, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 772. See Boskey & Gressman, supra note 12; see also Amar, A Neo-federalist view of Article
III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1985) (Article III creates
a two tiers of federal jurisdiction-one for mandatory federal questions and a second for discretionary
jurisdiction. Amar argues that Congress regulates only the discretionary tier.).
52. There is no satisfactory way of defining "equity." The gist of equity, however, is that a
liberal interpretation of legislative words will be used, if necessary in a particular case, to achieve a
just result. See A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 283-84 (1958).
53. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REV. 244, 245 (1945); Glenn &
Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753 (1945); Von Moschzisker,
Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1927); see also Adams, The Origin
of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87 (1916).
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the equity courts were completely independent of the law courts.54 The
Lord Chancellor of England headed the equity courts, which dispensed
justice in cases that did not fit within the rigid formulas of the common-
law system. 55 While equity courts dispensed "justice" on an individual
basis depending upon the facts in each case, the common-law courts were
constrained by the doctrine of precedent, which prescribed that a partic-
ular decision can be "justified" only if it is deducible from a prior deci-
sion.56 As Blackstone noted, equity exists for circumstances "wherein
the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient." 57 The Framers
merged the English Courts of Chancery's equity with the written com-
mon-law system of precedent, allowing all cases to travel through the
same system whether they request equitable relief or application of com-
mon-law precedent.58 The distinction between the two systems is pre-
served, however, because a case must fall "within the traditional scope of
equity as historically evolved in the English Court of Chancery" before
equitable relief will be granted. 59 Equity, unlike written common law,6°
is a pliable concept, and consequently, the judicial branch under our
Constitution plays a discretionary role when applying equitable concepts
to achieve just results.
61
This equitable power, or discretion, could be abused if not for an
organizational structure that constrains its use,62 and the Supreme
Court's rules provide this structure. Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 conferred inherent power to make necessary rules "for the orderly
conducting [ofi business" 63 upon all federal courts, including the
54. Various theories abound regarding the beginnings of the two court systems in England, but
records clearly establish both an equity court and a common-law court system as early as the four-
teenth century in England. See Adams, supra note 53, at 87-89.
55. Glenn & Redden, supra note 53, at 760-61.
56. R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICA-
TION 56-83 (1961).
57. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *62.
58. See Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 205 (1893) ("The equity jurisdiction conferred
on the Federal courts is the same that the High Court of Chancery in England possesses .... ); H.
MAINE, POPULAR GOVERNMENT 218 (1886) (the "Federal Judicature established by the American
Constitution as a whole... had its roots in the Past, and most of their beginnings must be sought in
England."); Note, 2 HARV. L. REv. 382, 383 (1889) ("[P]olitical institutions, like living organisms,
are as a rule developed from earlier institutions by a process of selecting and adopting those features
which experience has proven to be best adapted to the needs of the political environment ...."); see
generally Adams, supra note 53; Glenn & Redden, supra note 53.
59. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.).
60. Law here is used in the positivist sense-a written code that determines the attachment of
rights to individuals during their interaction in a governed society without regard for the law's moral
content. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-89 (1961).
61. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1-9 (1980).
62. J.K. GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 54 (1983) (citing A. BERLE, JR., POWER
(1969)).
63. Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 reads:
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Supreme Court; and the Process Act Amendment of 1793 64 made clear
that this power was limited so as not to be contrary to the laws of the
United States.65 Before the Supreme Court could decide its first case, it
had to inform the litigants of its procedures. One of the first rules that
the Supreme Court wrote, regarding the administration of its docket, de-
scribed the management of its business as analogous to the English eq-
uity courts:
The Chief Justice, in answer to the motion of the Attorney Gen-
eral, made yesterday, informs him and the bar, that this court consider
the practice of the courts of king's bench, and of chancery, in England,
as affording outlines for the practice of this court; and that they will,
from time to time, make such alterations therein as circumstances may
render necessary.
66
Since our country has a common-law system, following English proce-
dure made practical sense and, as the need arose, the Court developed
other rules using English equity court procedures as guidelines, one of
which was the equity procedure of "rehearing."
The English equity courts developed the doctrine of rehearing in
response to a need for review of their decisions.67 Unlike the law courts
from which a litigant could appeal to a higher court, the equity courts of
the Chancellor used the device of "rehearing" because there was no
higher body to hear appeals when the Chancellor erred.68 Rehearing al-
lowed the Chancellor to reconsider a decision and correct and revise a
previously expressed opinion before finality occurred. 69 When the high-
est law court ruled in a case, a litigant could request a writ of error,
And be it further enacted, That all the said courts of the United States shall have power to
grant new trials, in cases where there has been a trial by jury for reasons for which new
trials have usually been granted in the courts of law; and shall have power to impose and
administer all necessary oaths or affirmations, and to punish by fine or imprisonments, at
the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the
same; and to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting [sic] business
in the said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States.
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789) (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
64. 1 Stat. 333 (1793).
65. Id. at 335. This amendment read:
[I]t shall be lawful for the several courts of the United States, from time to time, as occa-
sion may require, to make rules and orders for their respective courts... as shall be fit and
necessary for the advancement of justice, and especially to that end to prevent delays in
proceedings.
66. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) xvi (Aug. 8, 1791). This rule, in one form or another, governed the Court
until 1954. The last codification of this rule was in 1931: "This court considers the former practice
of the courts of king's bench and of chancery, in England, as affording outlines for the practice of
this court in matters not covered by its rules or decisions, or the laws of Congress." Sup. CT. R. 5,
286 U.S. 596 (1932).
67. Degnan & Louisell, supra note 4, at 904.
68. Id. at 903. It has been said that one of the procedures of equity which was superior to law
was the rehearing process. See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 372-73 (1926).
69. Degnan & Louisell, supra note 4, at 904.
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which allowed another decision in the case only upon a showing of clear
error in the former decision. By contrast, in the equity courts there was
no need to show error of any kind before a rehearing would be granted.
Rather, a litigant simply had to show need, and the Chancellor could
grant a rehearing in order to dispense the most "just" justice possible.
70
For basically the same reason-that there was nowhere to appeal its deci-
sions-the Supreme Court allowed litigants to request rehearing.
The Supreme Court rehears cases because it is the highest court in
the federal system-and for the particular litigants involved, a Supreme
Court error can be corrected only by rehearing. 71 As Justice Jackson
described the Court: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we
are infallible only because we are final."' 72 The theory underlying the
Supreme Court's power to rehear cases is that as a court of last resort it
must have a means by which it can admit and correct its misjudgment,
and a court which is final must also be deliberate and thorough.73 The
decision to rehear a case is an equitable decision with the goal of attain-
ing justice for the particular litigants involved, which is precisely what a
legal system is supposed to do.74 The problem with an equitable decision
is that it does not necessarily follow from common law and may proceed
from concepts as varied as "fairness," "moral good," and "justice."
Although concepts of justice cannot be formed into rigid rules for a court
to apply, rules can be written that will enable litigants to request an equi-
table decision, such as a rehearing. The procedures of the Supreme
Court regarding a litigant's application for rehearing are found in the
Supreme Court Rules.
III. REHEARING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Supreme Court Rule 51 governs litigants' requests for rehearings of
any judgment or decision of the Court.75 Rule 51.1 governs requests for
70. Id.
71. Of course, there is always legislative veto of a Supreme Court decision, but such process
takes much time and, usually, does not aid the particular litigants in the original lawsuit.
72. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
73. Degnan & Louisell, supra note 4, at 907.
74. Wasserstrom, Equity: The Case of an Equitable Decision Procedure in READINGS IN PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW 118 (1984).
75.
A petition for rehearing of any judgment or decision other than one on a petition for
writ of certiorari, shall be filed within 25 days after the judgment or decision, unless the
time is shortened or enlarged by the Court or a Justice. Forty copies, produced in con-
formity with Rule 33, must be filed (except where the party is proceeding informapauperis
under Rule 46), accompanied by proof of service as prescribed by Rule 28. Such petition
must briefly and distinctly state its grounds. Counsel must certify that the petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay; one copy of the certificate shall bear the manu-
script signature of counsel.' A petition for rehearing is not subject to oral argument, and
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rehearing of a decision on the merits, and Rule 51.276 governs requests
for rehearing of a denial of petition for certiorari. Under both Rule 51.1
and 51.2 at least one of the Justices who agree to the rehearing must have
previously joined in the majority decision sought to be reheard. Both
sections also require that counsel certify that her request for rehearing is
made in "good faith and not for delay." 77 Under Rule 51.2 the grounds
for rehearing are limited, and a litigant must show either intervening cir-
cumstances or "other substantial grounds" before rehearing of a writ for
certiorari will be considered.78 On the other hand, Rule 51.1 does not
require specific or substantial grounds for a rehearing of the Court's deci-
sion on the merits. Rather, as in rehearing in equity courts, if a litigant
persuades the Court that the Court has possibly erred, the Court will
grant rehearing.
7 9
While decisions to grant rehearing upon denials of certiorari do oc-
cur, they are of little interest because Rule 51.2 spells out exactly what
the grounds are for rehearing, and a litigant may not apply for a rehear-
ing of a denial of certiorari unless those specific grounds are present.80
Rule 51.1 decisions, however, which grant rehearing after the Court has
rendered a decision, are of great interest because they often elucidate the
Court's decisionmaking process and admit error or substantial change in
the circumstances of the law.
Of even more interest are cases where the Court itself has requested
rehearing sua sponte after hearing oral arguments in a case, but before
rendering its decision. It is this aspect of rehearing that is not governed
by Supreme Court Rule 51 or any other rule. On the contrary, the
will not be granted except at the instance of a Justice who concurred in the judgment or
decision and with the concurrence of a majority of the Court.
Sup. CT. R. 51.1.
76. Sup. Cr. R. 51.2.
77. Sup. Cr. R. 51.1 & 51.2.
78. Rule 51.2 reads:
A petition for rehearing of an order denying a petition for writ of certiorari shall
comply with all the form and filing requirements of paragraph. 1, but its grounds must be
limited to intervening circumstances of substantial or controlling effect or to other substan-
tial grounds not previously presented. Counsel must certify that the petition is restricted to
the grounds specified in this paragraph and that it is presented in good faith and not for
delay; one copy of the certificate shall bear the manuscript signature of counsel or of the
party when not represented by counsel. A petition for rehearing without such certificate
shall be rejected by the Clerk. Such petition is not subject to oral argument.
Sup. Cr. R. 51.2.
79. Degnan & Louisell, supra note 4, at 909. The authors list numerous reasons why courts
will not grant a rehearing. These include the addition of a new legal theory or new legal argument
that the litigant did not earlier argue; consideration of issues not raised at trial; and the unsupported
claim that "more argument" would be useful. Id. at 910; see generally Cook, The Rehearing Evil, 14
IOWA L. REV. 36 (1928).




Supreme Court can request rehearing sua sponte for the same reasons
that it asserts the power of judicial review-because according to the
Court it is the judiciary's "province and duty" to do So. 81
The most famous assertion of the Court's inherent power as "neces-
sary" to the judicial department occurred in 1803 in Marbury v.
Madison,82 where the Court enunciated the power of judicial review as
"emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department.18 3
Neither Congress, nor any Supreme Court Rule, regulates the power of
judicial review. It is grounded in the Court's inherent power as a judici-
ary and supported by the systemic argument that the Court's role in the
constitutional plan is to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
The first time that the Court requested rehearing sua sponte was in
the 1819 case of Bullard v. Bell.84 In Bullard, the attorneys had argued
the case in the absence of one of the Justices, Mr. Justice Todd.8 5 The
Court continued the case and directed reargument because the Justices
who were present at the original argument were equally divided in opin-
ion, and counsel had consented to the Court's request for reargument.86
The Court elucidated its power to request rehearing sua sponte in
the 1852 case of Brown v. Aspden,8 7 in which a lower court decision had
been affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court with eight members
presiding. Because of the even split, the plaintiff filed a petition for a
rehearing. The Court held that affirmance by an equally divided Court
was not grounds for granting reargument 88 In response to the plaintiff's
reference to rehearing in the English Courts of Chancery, the Court took
the opportunity to expound upon the differences between rehearing in the
English Chancery courts of original jurisdiction and in the Supreme
Court sitting as an appellate tribunal. The Court held that a litigant's
request for rehearing would be limited to the time "after judgment is
entered, provided the order for reargument is entered at the same
term."8' 9 The Court reasoned that this rule would avoid the rehearing
81. The essence of Chief Justice Marshall's argument for the creation of judicial review in Mar-
bury v. Madison is found in the oft-quoted sentence: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
82. Id. at 137.
83. Id. at 177.
84. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) vii (1819).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 25 (1852).
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id. at 26; see also Public Schools v. Walker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 603, 604 (1870) (citing Brown
v. Aspden, the Court denied litigants' request for rehearing because no member of the Court who
concurred in the judgment desired a reargument).
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problem in England where cases dragged on for several years.
Chief Justice Taney then announced the Court's own power to re-
quest rehearing when necessary:
[T]his court may and would call for a re-argument, where doubts are
entertained which it is supposed may be removed by further discussion
at the bar .... But the rule of the court is this: that no re-argument
will be heard in any case after judgement is entered, unless some mem-
ber of the court who concurred in the judgment afterwards doubts the
correctness of his opinion, and desires a further argument on the sub-
ject. And when that happens, the court will, of its own accord, apprise
the counsel of its wishes, and designate the points on which it desires
to hear them.90
Taney clearly stated that the Court could and would request rehearing
without the consent of counsel whenever the Court deemed rehearing nec-
essary. Thus, the Court asserted that the right to request rehearing sua
sponte was inherent in the Court's duty to see that justice is done, and
this duty expired at the end of each term.
The Court expounded on this "term rule" in 1881 in Bronson v.
Schulten,9' where it noted that at common law a court had no power to
vacate or modify a judgment after the expiration of the term in which the
judgment had been rendered. There were two exceptions to the "term
rule" that allowed the Court to correct errors after the term's expira-
tion-where errors were in form or were purely clerical. 92 The Supreme
Court recognized that it had the power during a term to modify any
judgment rendered during that term93 and, thus, proceeded to incorpo-
rate the term rule as part of its judicial power over its judgments.
The extent to which one agrees with the Court's right to request
rehearing sua sponte determines the faith one has in the Court's ability to
constrain itself to use its equitable powers to serve the ends of justice.
The debate, however, may be moot since the Court has asserted this
power for well over one hundred years.
IV. Two CASES OF ACTIVIST REHEARING SUA SPONTE: THE
WARREN COURT AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
94
Congress can regulate the Court's sua sponte power due to Congress'
90. 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 26-27.
91. 104 U.S. 410 (1881).
92. Id. at 416.
93. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 42, at 781.
94. Although Chief Justice Earl Warren and Chief Justice William Rehnquist are ideological
opposites, both have effectively used their positions arguably to achieve "policy" goals. See
Glennon, Will the Real Conservatives Please Stand Up?, 76 A.B.A. J. 48 (Aug. 1990); Howard,
Living With the Warren Legacy, 75 A.B.A. J. 68 (Oct. 1989).
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control of Supreme Court procedures, which includes the Supreme Court
Rules.95 But Congress has never addressed the matter of rehearing sua
sponte. Perhaps Congress may never have to address this issue.96 In the
Warren Court decision, United States v. Ohio Power Co.,97 and the recent
Rehnquist Court memorandum decision, Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union,98 vigorous dissents were filed and the legal community focused
attention on the Court's actions. The two cases have precedential value,
however, and lay a foundation on which a future activist Supreme Court
could take advantage.
A. United States v. Ohio Power Co.99
In United States v. Ohio Power Co., the Supreme Court requested
rehearing sua sponte more than a year after final judgment was entered.
The Ohio Power case concerned Ohio Power Company's early escape
from tax liability, an advantage that companies which brought their tax
appeals later did not escape. 100 Ohio Power Company sued to recover an
alleged overpayment of taxes-a tax refund-under section 124(f) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Section 124(f) allowed accelerated
amortization of the cost of constructing wartime facilities. The War Pro-
duction Board (WPB) had to certify that the construction cost was neces-
sary in the interest of national defense. The WPB certified only part of
Ohio Power's costs as "necessary," and Ohio Power sued for certification
of all of its costs. The United States Court of Claims entered judgment in
favor of Ohio Power Company, and the government appealed. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 17, 1955,101 and on Decem-
ber 5, 1955 the Court denied the government's petition for a rehearing on
the government's request for certiorari.10 2 On May 28, 1956, the Court
denied the government's motion for leave to file a second petition for
rehearing.10 3 Nevertheless, on June 11, 1956, the Court vacated sua
sponte its order of December 5, 1955 and requested rehearing so that the
case would be disposed of in a manner consistent with two other cases in
95. See Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072)
(establishing a unified set of rules to govern procedure in all federal courts).
96. Because of the fuss caused by its request in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, it may be a
long time before the Court requests rehearing sua sponte. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
97. 353 U.S. 98 (1957).
98. 485 U.S. 617 (1988) (rehearing ordered sua sponte), decided 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
99. 353 U.S. 98 (1957).
100. Id. at 99 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
101. 350 U.S. 862 (1955).
102. 350 U.S. 919 (1955).
103. 351 U.S. 958 (1956).
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which the Court had granted certiorari.'°4 In those two cases, the Court
denied full-cost amortization to National Lead Company and Allen-
Bradley Company. 10 5 The Court gave two reasons for its resurrection
sua sponte of the Ohio Power case: that the rehearing would ensure the
"interests of justice" and "uniformity in the application of the principles
announced in the two companion cases."
'10 6
In granting the rehearing sua sponte in Ohio Power, the Court ig-
nored Supreme Court Rule 58, the 1955 counterpart to today's Rule 51,
which governed petitions for rehearing. Rule 58 permitted the filing of
petitions for rehearing by unsuccessful litigants within twenty-five days
of the denial of a petition for certiorari or after the entry of an adverse
judgment or order.10 7 The literal language of paragraph 4 of Rule 58
precluded petitions for rehearing after the twenty-five day limit: "Con-
secutive petitions for rehearing, and petitions for rehearing that are out
of time under this rule, will not be received."'' 0 8 Instead of basing its
decision to rehear the Ohio Power case on any interpretation of Rule 58,
the Court based its decision upon the Court's inherent power over its
own judgment,' °9 known as the "term rule."1t 0
Congress, in an attempt to abolish the Supreme Court's judicially
created "term rule," added provision 28 U.S.C. section 452 to the 1948
recodification of the Judicial Code. The wording of section 452 was
adopted verbatim from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(c), which had
abolished the "term rule" in the federal district courts."' It seemed,
104. 351 U.S. 980 (1956). The two other cases were United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., cert.
granted, 351 U.S. 981 (1956) and National Lead Co. v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 351 U.S. 981 (1956).
105. National Lead Co. v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 313 (1957); United States v. Allen-Bradley
Co., 352 U.S. 306 (1957).
106. 353 U.S. 98, 98-99 (1957).
107. Id. at 101 n.7 (Harlan, J., dissenting, with whom Frankfurter, J., and Burton, J., join). Out-
of-time petitions are those petitions which are filed past the deadline for filing. The deadline for
requesting rehearing is 25 days after final judgment, and the Court requested rehearing sua sponte in
the case over a year after final judgment. See Sup. CT. R. 51.4: "Consecutive petitions for rehear-
ings, and petitions for rehearing that are out of time under this Rule, will not be received." But cf
Sup. CT. R. 51.1 (allowing 25 days after final judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by
the Court or a Justice).
108. Sup. Ct. R. 58(4) (1955). In another case of rehearing, Justice Clark stated that he believed
that Rule 58(4) meant exactly what it said: He "thought that successive petitions for rehearing
would not be received by the Court under its Rule 58(4)." Gondeck v. Pan American World Air-
ways, 382 U.S. 25, 28 (1965) (Clark, J., concurring); see also Wiener, The Supreme Court's New
Rules, 68 HARv. L. REV. 20, 83-87 (1954); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 42, at 775-98.
109. "This policy finds expression in the manner in which we have exercised our power over our
own judgments, both in civil and criminal cases." United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 99
(1957).
110. See supra notes 88, 90-91 and accompanying text; see also R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra
note 42, at 781.
111. "The purpose of this amendment is to prevent reliance upon the continued existence of a
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therefore, that section 452 countermanded the Supreme Court's "term
rule." The Court, however, continued to grant out-of-time rehearings. 112
In the period between the passage of section 452 in 1948 and the
Ohio Power decision in 1956, the Court granted out-of-time petitions for
rehearing nine times in violation of the legislative intent of section 452.
In five of the out-of-time cases, the Court continued the use of the "term
rule,"11 3 while in the following four cases, as in Ohio Power, the Court
invoked its inherent power to contravene Congress' regulatory
scheme. 114
In Remrner v. United States, 115 a criminal case, the Court granted an
out-of-time petition for rehearing because the Court had decided an in-
tervening case.1 6 Originally, the Court had remanded Remmer for fur-
ther proceedings," 7 but because the intervening decision would allow
Remmer to return eventually to the Court on certiorari, the Court al-
lowed rehearing to avoid the delay and expense of further proceedings.
Likewise, in Achilli v. United States, 118 another criminal case, the Court
vacated a November 19, 1956 denial of certiorari, granted an out-of-time
petition for rehearing, and granted certiorari. 1 9 The Court limited the
grant of certiorari, however, to the question of whether the petitioner
could be prosecuted and sentenced under a section of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939. Achilli was identical to Remmer in that the petitioner
raised the same question before the district court on remand from the
term as a source of power to disturb the finality of a judgment upon grounds other than those stated
in these rules." Advisory Comm. on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amendments to
Rules 6 (1946). Justice Clark opined that the term rule had "some historical justification but no
present justification." Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules, Cleveland 211 (1938); see also
Wiener, supra note 107, at 85.
112. On June 27, 1949, one year after Congress enacted § 452, the Court granted an out-of-time
petition for rehearing in Clark v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 337 U.S. 953 (1949), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 910 (1949). On June 7, 1954, the Court vacated sua sponte three previous orders denying
certiorari and restored the cases to the Court's calendar. Goldbaum v. United States, 347 U.S. 1007
(1954), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 831 (1953); Banks v. United States, 347 U.S. 1007 (1954), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 857 (1953); McFee v. United States, 347 U.S. 1007 (1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 929
(1954). On May 14, 1956, the Court granted a motion to recall and amend its judgment after the
rehearing period had expired, saying that Rule 58(4) "does not prohibit motions to correct this kind
of error." Cahill v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 351 U.S. 183, 184 (1956), recalling and amending,
350 U.S. 898 (1955), reh'g denied, 350 U.S. 943 (1956) (recalling case that was previously remanded
to the district court and remanding it instead to the court of appeals).
113. See cases cited supra note 111.
114. Achilli v. United States, 352 U.S. 1023 (1957); Remmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 904
(1955); Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956); and Boudoin v. Lykes
Bros. S.S., 350 U.S. 811 (1954).
115. 348 U.S. 904 (1955).
116. In the rehearing, the Court remanded Remmer for reconsideration in light of the Court's
decision in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
117. Returner v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
118. 353 U.S. 373 (1957).
119. Achilli, 352 U.S. at 1023.
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court of appeals after the Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari.
Achilli then successfully petitioned for certiorari from the district court's
new decision.12
0
In Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 1 2t a race discrimina-
tion case, the Court vacated a May 24, 1954 denial of certiorari, granted
an out-of-time petition for rehearing, and granted certiorari. 122 The
Court had originally denied certiorari and remanded the case to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court to be reconsidered in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in the Segregation Cases,1 23 which were decided one week earlier
on May 17, 1954. The Court vacated and granted certiorari ten months
later because the Florida Supreme Court was delaying in implementing
the admission of a black to a state law school despite the Supreme
Court's mandate to do so.
124
And finally, to correct a simple clerical error, which is an allowable
ground for rehearing even in a common-law court, the Court in Boudoin
v. Lykes Bros. S.S. ,125 recalled a judgment that had been returned to the
district court for further proceedings and remanded the case to the court
of appeals instead. 1
26
The Ohio Power case, on the other hand, was not a criminal case, did
not involve racial discrimination, did not expedite continuing litigation,
nor was any clerical error made in the Court's previous disposition of the
case. Moreover, the issue involved in Ohio Power was not a continuing
issue because the statute, Internal Revenue Code section 124(f), under
which the case was brought, had expired in 1945.127 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court vacated its previous orders in Ohio Power and requested
rehearing sua sponte in the "interests of justice." The Court, however,
never explained exactly what interests of justice demanded the ignoring
of Congress' clear intent in section 452 to abolish the term rule.
120. 353 U.S. 373 (1957). See also United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 107 (1957)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
121. 350 U.S. 413 (1956).
122. Id. The litigant's request for certiorari was denied at 342 U.S. 877 (1951), and that decision
was recalled and vacated at 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
123. The "Segregation Cases" refers to the two cases decided on May 17, 1954, by the U.S.
Supreme Court: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
124. Florida ex reL Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956).
125. 350 U.S. 811 (1955).
126. Id. See also United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 107 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing, with whom Frankfurter, J., and Burton, J., join) (Boudoin concerned correction of error in
Court's own mandate).
127. I.R.C. § 124(f)(1) (1939), added by 54 Stat. 998-1003 (1940), as amended, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 23(t), 124 (1946).
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B. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 128
The Rehnquist Court's memorandum decision in Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union involved the important issue of whether private racial
discrimination is remediable under 42 U.S.C. section 1981.129 In Patter-
son, the Court requested sua sponte the parties to brief and argue the
question of whether the Court's previous interpretation of section 1981 in
Runyon v. McCrary 130 should be reconsidered.13' Yet, neither party had
previously raised the issue of Runyon's reconsideration. 132 In Runyon,
the Court had outlawed racial discrimination in private school admis-
sions, following the precedent of Jones v. Mayer, 33 which outlawed pri-
vate racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing.
In Jones, a real estate developer had refused to sell property to
blacks. Jones, a black, sued. The issue was whether private racial dis-
crimination was remedial under 42 U.S.C. section 1982, a companion
statute to section 1981.134 The Court held that the legislative history of
section 1982 clearly showed that the act was intended to apply to private
as well as public racial discrimination. 135 Prior to the Court's interpreta-
tion of section 1982 in Jones, the statute had been an unenforced promise
of racial freedom. t 36 After Jones, section 1982 became a formidable
weapon for protection of civil rights whether the alleged discrimination
was private in nature or involved "state action."' 137 Thus, the "state ac-
128. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), reh'g ordered sua sponte, 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1981) reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
130. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
131. 485 U.S. at 617 (per curiam).
132. "Neither the parties nor the Solicitor General have argued that Runyon should be reconsid-
ered." Id. at 622 (Stevens, J., dissenting with whom Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.,
join).
133. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1981) reads: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold and convey real and personal property."
135. 392 U.S. at 422-36 (setting forth legislative history of § 1982 from its inception in § I of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866). Justice Stewart delivering the opinion of the Court said:
Hence the structure of the 1866 Act, as well as its language, points to the conclusion urged
by the petitioners in this case-that § I was meant to prohibit all racially motivated depri-
vations of the rights enumerated in the statute, although only those deprivations perpe-
trated "under color of law" were to be criminally punishable under § 2.
392 U.S. at 426.
136. See generally Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1294 (1969).
137. Id. Previously, the Court required "state action" before finding a violation of a black's civil
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tion" limitation was no longer a precedent to civil rights actions.
In Runyon v. McCrary, two black children, through their parents,
brought suit against a private school under 42 U.S.C. section 1981 be-
cause they had been denied admission on the basis of their race.' 38 In
deciding whether section 1981 prohibited private racial discrimination,
the Court considered whether it had properly construed section 1981's
companion statute, section 1982, in Jones when it extended liability for
racial discrimination to the making and enforcing of private contracts.
139
The Court held that both section 1981 and section 1982 reached purely
private acts of racial discrimination.1 40 In a concurring opinion in Run-
yon, Justice Stevens stated that the stability that would result from fol-
lowing the Jones precedent outweighed the argument that Jones was
wrongly decided. 141
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, a black employee of the credit
union sued under section 1981 alleging racial discrimination in a private
employment setting.' 42 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider whether racial "harassment" was remediable under section 1981.143
After oral argument, the Court requested sua sponte that the parties brief
and argue an additional question: "Whether or not the interpretation of
42 U.S.C. section 1981 adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary
should be reconsidered?'" 44
Although four Justices dissented ini two separate dissents from the
Court's sua sponte request for reargument, neither dissent focused on the
procedure of requesting reargument, but rather on the lack of grounds
for requesting reargument. 45 The original issue in the Patterson case
was whether to extend the Court's interpretation of section 1981, which
already prohibited discrimination in private employment contracts, to
cases of racial harassment in the workplace.146 The Court, however,
chose a different issue for rehearing, stating in its per curiam opinion that
it had "decided, in light of the difficulties posed by petitioner's argument
rights. The Court had reasoned that the thirteenth amendment did not give Congress the power to
tamper with private, social rights. See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
138. The school stated upon inquiry that it was not integrated, and it accepted only members of
the Caucasian race. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 165 (1976).
139. Id. at 170-72.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986).
143. 484 U.S. 814 (1987).
144. 485 U.S. 617 (1988) (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting with whom Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Stevens, J.,
join); Id. at 621 (Stevens, J., dissenting with whom Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., join).
146. 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986).
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for a fundamental extension of liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1981, to
consider whether Runyon should be overruled."1 47 Though the Court
went on to support the proposition that former precedent can be over-
ruled or modified,1 48 nowhere in the majority opinion did the Court ex-
plain what "difficulties" the petitioner's argument posed that demanded
a reconsideration of Runyon.
The Court's action was particularly puzzling because Runyon had
been decided in accord with congressional action taken after the Court
decided the Jones case. The Senate responded to the Jones decision in
1972, and debated amending section 1981 to expressly preclude recovery
in cases of employment discrimination. Such action would have made
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act the exclusive remedy for employ-
ment discrimination. The Senate declined to amend section 1981 because
"every protection that the law has in its purview"' 49 should be used to
protect victims of employment discrimination. The House of Represent-
atives, which previously had criticized the Jones decision, accepted the
Senate's decision.' 50 Therefore, both Houses of Congress agreed with the
Supreme Court's interpretation in Jones that section 1981 applied to em-
ployment discrimination even before the Court decided Runyon in 1976.
Moreover, in Runyon, following Congress' lead, the Court went a step
further and extended section 1981 to all private contracts.' 5 ' Neverthe-
less, in the face of congressional intent to end racial discrimination, the
Supreme Court requested sua sponte the litigants in Patterson to address
whether Runyon should be overruled.'
52
On June 15, 1989, the Court rendered its final decision in Patter-
son.' 53 Although the Court expressly stated that "[s]ome Members of
this Court believe that Runyon was decided incorrectly," the Court con-
cluded that Runyon should not be overruled.154 Justice Kennedy, writ-
ing for the majority, based the Court's refusal to overrule Runyon on
considerations of stare decisis. 155 The Court further said that stare decisis
precluded overruling prior precedent, and "the burden borne by the
147. Patterson, 485 U.S. at 617 (emphasis in the original).
148. Id. at 618.
149. See 118 CONG. REC. 3371, 3372 (1972).
150. H.R. REP. No. 899, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. at 118 CONG. REC. 6643 (1972).
151. 427 U.S. at 168.
152. 485 U.S. 617, 617 (1988).
153. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
154. Id. at 2370. The Court also declined to extend section 1981 to racial harassment reasoning
that "conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the
right to enforce established contract obligations" was not remediable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at
2369.
155. Id. at 2370.
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party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is greater
where the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory construc-
tion."1 56 The Court, however, never addressed the fact that it had re-
quested reargument sua sponte on whether to overrule Runyon, and that
the parties had not presented that issue. In fact, the Court never dis-
cussed its reasons, or the "difficulties" that led it to request rehearing sua
sponte.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S USE OF REHEARING SUA SPONTE
The most fundamental social, economic, philosophical, and political
questions reach the Supreme Court in the form of lawsuits.1 57 As Alexis
de Tocqueville astutely observed over one hundred years ago:
[Flew laws can escape the searching analysis of the judicial power for
any length of time, for there are few that are not prejudicial to some
private interest or other, and none that may not be brought before a
court of justice by the choice of parties or by the necessity of the
case. 
158
Indeed, the Court hears only a small proportion of the thousands of cases
that request Supreme Court review. 159 Which cases the Court chooses to
decide indicates its policies and priorities as well as the extent of its influ-
ence upon the political discourse both in our government and among
citizens. Despite this considerable discretion, the Court is still limited to
the cases and issues which the litigants choose to present. This limitation
assures that an activist Court may not reach out and decide just any issue
of its choice. In other words, even an activist Court must bide its time
waiting for the "perfect" case.
This control of the issues by the litigants is central to our adversarial
system of law. The Constitution embodies the adversarial system in sec-
tion two of Article III which extends the judicial power to all "Cases" or
"Controversies."'160 It does not extend the power to all "issues of interest
to the Justices." In addition to this constitutional constraint on the
Court's jurisdiction, the Court has created rules of self-restraint, includ-
ing the doctrine of advisory opinions, ripeness, standing, and moot-
ness. I61 Both the constitutional limitation of case or controversy and the
156. Id.
157. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., supra note 7.
158. A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106 (P. Bradley ed. 1945) (H. Reeve Text
as revised by F. Bowen 1862) (discussing the "immense political influence" of the United States
judiciary).
159. See G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note !.
160. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see text supra note 24.
161. See ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390 (1900) ("Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide
moot cases because their constitutional authority extends only to actual cases or controversies.");
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judicially created doctrines comport with the Court's duty to avoid con-
stitutional questions unless necessary 1
62
Since the presentation of issues and arguments to the Court are the
litigants' responsibility, rehearing requests should also be their responsi-
bility. The Court Should be limited to very specific grounds before it can
request rehearing upon its own motion. It is the litigants' responsibility
to point to the Court's error and request rehearing in cases where the
Court has misunderstood specific facts or where the Court has over-
looked binding authority. In either of these situations, it will be obvious
to the litigants that the Court has erred, and likewise, the litigants will
know to request rehearing.
Had the litigants requested reargument in Patterson to consider the
Runyon issue, the Court could have granted the request with little fan-
fare. The litigants, however, did not raise the Runyon issue.1 63 This lack
of litigant initiative troubled the dissenting Justices, one of whom stated:
"the adversary process functions most effectively when we rely on the
initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion the
questions for review."'64
By rehearing sua sponte, the Court can accelerate the "sooner or
later" timing of an issue's arrival and, thereby, evade the Constitution's
jurisdictional constraints. Thus, the Court can address either issues that
have not been decided by a politically accountable body or, worse, issues
that have been decided by political representatives. The latter set of is-
sues gives the Court the opportunity to invalidate legislative enactments
without anyone requesting that they do so. Both actions raise the
countermajoritarian difficulty and possibly violate the Constitution's case
or controversy limitation.
The greater problem with unrestricted sua sponte rehearing is the
possibility that the procedure will be used by an activist Court or Justice
to further a personal agenda.165 Justice Kennedy's statement in Patter-
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (discussion by Justice
Douglas of the standing doctrine); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (ripeness); 1
C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 108-11 (1926) (advisory
opinions).
162. One rationale of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison was that the power of judi-
cial review was a reluctant power necessary only because the Court must decide cases brought before
it in conformity with the Constitution. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
163. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 621, 622 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 623 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214, 1216 (1984)).
165. Such a scenario has been used to argue against unconstrained judicial review and the same
argument applies to rehearing sua sponte. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9 (1959).
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son that "some Members of this Court believe that Runyon was decided
incorrectly" 166 could support the argument that the Rehnquist Court has
such an agenda regarding civil rights. Such argument, however, is mere
speculation. The real problem with unregulated sua sponte rehearing is
that the Court is perceived as having a personal agenda whether it does in
fact have one or not.
When the parties choose the issues, there is little opportunity for
judges to pursue their own agendas and, as a consequence, the proceed-
ings are not only fairer, but are perceived as fairer. 167 As Justice Black-
mun said in his dissent to the Patterson memorandum decision that
requested rehearing sua sponte:
I am at a loss to understand the motivation of five Members of this
Court to reconsider an interpretation of a civil rights statute that so
clearly reflects our society's earnest commitment to ending racial dis-
crimination, and in which Congress so evidently has acquiesced. I can
find no justification for the bare majority's apparent eagerness to con-
sider rewriting well-established law.
168
Such commentary, especially from a member of the Court, raises ques-
tions as to the impartiality of the Court's actions, and such speculation
tarnishes the Court's legitimacy. Litigant control of the issues is impor-
tant to satisfy not only the parties, but society as well. As stated by the
Supreme Court: "[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice."1 69
When the Court solicits issues that the litigants have not presented, the
Court erodes its credibility and trespasses on the soul of the adversarial
system.
Because the Court decides constitutional issues, which affect us all,
society's confidence in the Court's ability to render impartial and rea-
soned decisions is as important as the decisions themselves. As a result
of the tremendous power with which Congress has imbued the Court, it
is vital that decisions of the Court be perceived as legitimate. Damage to
the legal system may be caused by "frequent or sudden reversals of direc-
tion that may appear to have been occasioned by nothing more signifi-
cant than a change in the identity of this Court's personnel."
1 70
The sua sponte requests for rehearing in Ohio Power and Patterson
tarnished the image of the Court as a neutral arbiter of our country's
166. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989).
167. S. LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 34 (1988).
168. 485 U.S. at 621 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
170. Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 153 (1981) (In a
concurrence, Justice Stevens reiterated the preference for stability.).
1989]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
problems. Both requests were trivial. As Justice Harlan noted in his
Ohio Power dissent:
There is nothing to distinguish [this case] from any other suit for a
money judgment in which a conflict turns up long after certiorari and
rehearing have been denied. The most that can be said in justification
of the Court's action is that otherwise Ohio Power would not have to
pay taxes which Allen-Bradley and National Lead must pay as a result
of the much later decisions in their cases.
17 1
And after all the uproar that the Patterson memorandum decision
caused,'72 the Court in its final decision stated: "Whether Runyon's in-
terpretation of § 1981 . . . is right or wrong as an original matter, it is
certain that it is not inconsistent with the prevailing sense of justice in
this country."'
173
A potentially more serious problem with the Ohio Power and the
Patterson memorandum decisions is that they remain "on the books."
The Court may use both decisions as support for a future attempt to
reach out and pick a specific issue. The precedential value of the opin-
ions will outlast the fuss surrounding them. A future decision may over-
rule or extend the final decisions in both cases, but it is improbable that
the Court can change the decisions requesting rehearing sua sponte. Ar-
guments against the constitutional use of sua sponte rehearing may ap-
pear in law review articles and in congressional committees, but there is
no way a litigant could raise the issue to the Court. Thus, only Congress
can remedy the situation before it changes from a potential problem into
an actual problem.
Constitutional cases before the Supreme Court are important to peo-
ple other than the parties to the dispute, 74 and the Court's decision to
deliberate further and rehear oral arguments is justifiable when the liti-
gants request rehearing on grounds that the Court has made an error in
fact or law. Rehearing, however, may not be justifiable when the Court
itself requests rehearing sua sponte.
Occasionally, the Court has requested reargument before it has
reached a decision because of an equally divided Court 75 or a reconsti-
171. United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 99, 109 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
172. Amicus briefs were filed by the 47 states; the District of Columbia; Guam; the Virgin Is-
lands; 66 Senators; 118 Congressmen; the American Bar Association; the New York City Bar Asso-
ciation; New York County Lawyers Association; the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under
Law; and over 100 other organizations. Briefs in opposition included the Washington Legal Foun-
dation; 8 Congressmen; 3 Senators; the Center for Civil Rights; and the Equal Employment Advi-
sory Council. See Reidinger, Runyon Under the Gun, 74 A.B.A. J. 78, 80 (Nov. 1988); Eskridge,
Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 67, 68 n.8 (1988).
173. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2371 (1989).
174. Degnan & Louisell, supra note 4, at 911.
175. C. HUGHES, supra note 27, at 70-71.
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tuted Court. 176 An equally divided Court is one in which one or more
Justices were not present for oral argument and the remaining even
number of Justices are equally divided on an issue. 177 A reconstituted
Court, on the other hand, is one in which the composition of the Court
membership has changed during the time a case is pending in the Court.
This happens if a new Justice replaces a retiring or deceased Justice be-
tween oral argument and final decision in a case. t78 The Court may re-
quest reargument if the Court believes that the new Justice will be able to
break a deadlock or change the outcome of the decision. 17
9
The Patterson case involved a reconstituted Court and possibly an
equally divided Court. Patterson was originally argued February 29,
1988.180 The Court's request for reargument was made in a memoran-
dum decision dated April 25, 1988,181 with the Court hearing reargu-
ment on October 12, 1988.182 Between the original argument and the
reargument, Justice Anthony Kennedy was appointed to the Court to
replace retiring Justice Lewis Powell.183 Therefore, the Court that heard
reargument was a reconstituted Court. In addition, it may have been an
equally divided Court in that between Justice Powell's retirement and
Justice Kennedy's appointment, an eight member Court existed. In the
Patterson memorandum opinion that requested reargument, four Justices
dissented. 8 4 The per curiam majority, therefore, included Justice Ken-
nedy. 85 Consequently, the Court may also have been equally divided
after the original oral argument in Patterson.
However, the Patterson litigants and the legal community do not
know if the Court relied upon either of these legitimate reasons when it
requested reargument, and this leaves the Court open to the criticism
that it sought out the Runyon issue for activist reasons. Thus, it is im-
portant not only that the Court be confined to specific grounds when
requesting rehearing sua sponte, but also that the Court state the grounds
176. Degnan & Louisell, supra note 4, at 899, 913.
177. C. HUGHES, supra note 27, at 70-71; Degnan & Louisell, supra note 4, at 912 n.37.
178. Degnan & Louisell, supra note 4, at 913.
179. Id.
180. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2363 (1989).
181. 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
182. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
183. President Ronald Reagan appointed Judge Anthony M. Kennedy of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on November 23, 1987, and the Senate unanimously con-
firmed him on February 3, 1988. See also TRB, The Fifth Man, supra note 10.
184. One dissent by Justice Stevens in which Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall joined,
and one dissent by Justice Blackmun in which Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall joined.
185. The majority also included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and
Scalia.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
upon which it is requesting the rehearing. Only in this way will the pub-
lic's confidence in the Court remain untarnished.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's image as a fair and impartial arbiter of contemporary
issues calls for limited use of the Court's ability to request rehearing sua
sponte. Consequently, Congress should limit the Court's use of sua
sponte rehearing to two circumstances: (1) where the Court is equally
divided upon an issue, and (2) where the Court's membership has been
reconstituted after oral argument and before published decision. In both
of these circumstances, the litigants would have no way of knowing the
numeric division in the Court or whether their case had been decided
before the Court's membership changed. In the case of an even split
during the decisionmaking process, the Court itself may need a rehearing
to clarify the disputed issues, and this need of the Court would be un-
known to the litigants before a decision is rendered. 8 6 The same reason-
ing applies to a reconstituted Court as the timing of the actual decision is
unknown to the litigants and may occur weeks or months before the
opinion is written and published. Sua sponte requests for rehearing by
the Court should be used sparingly and regulated by written rules to pre-
serve the Court's image. Moreover, the Court, as a matter of policy,
should state upon which of the two grounds it is requesting rehearing sua
sponte.
Because of the countermajoritarian difficulty of allowing the Court
to request rehearing upon its own motion, Supreme Court Rule 51
should be amended to expressly allow the Court to request rehearing sua
sponte for only two reasons: (1) where the Court is equally divided upon
an issue, and (2) where the Court's membership has been reconstituted
after oral argument and before published decision.
186. The 5-4 decisions that the Court has rendered in the last few years raise doubt among the
legal community as to the length of tenure of these decisions. See Glennon, supra note 93; Howard,
supra note 93.
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